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This week five years ago people in Scotland would have been digesting the news 
that they were to be removed from the European Union. It is not yet possible to 
describe the full impact that decision will have on the people of Scotland. Some 
consequences, such as parts of the new rules on trade into the UK, are not yet fully 
in force. For those that are, assessing the real impact will take many years. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that many of the negative impacts which were envisaged 
are now starting to crystallise. 
 
This paper does not seek to provide an inventory of the full impact that Brexit will 
have. Instead it provides a summary of impacts and likely consequences in different 
areas of the economy and society, raising awareness of the likely consequences in 
broad terms. It is important that people are aware of these consequences, not least 
so they can consider the full range of possible remedies. 
 
This paper details a range of impacts which are each already being felt in the real 
world and are, importantly, illustrative of the very many other impacts likely to be 
felt in every part of our daily lives. 
 
Trade and the Economy 
 
Academic evidence suggests the UK’s exit from the EU has already had an impact 
on investment and the economy – in line with the Scottish Government’s long-term 
macroeconomic modelling. Born et al (2019)1 estimate that the output loss in the 
UK due to the EU referendum vote amounts to about 2.1% of GDP at the end of the 
first quarter 2019 and a study by Centre for European Reform (2019) also found 
that the UK economy was 2.9% smaller than it would be otherwise (by Q2 of 
2019)2. 
 
Reduced investment, together with changes in productivity and migration, are likely 
to create a further drag on the growth of the Scottish economy compared to 
continued membership of the EU. Scottish Government modelling indicates that in 
the long run, the basic Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiated by the UK 
                                         
1 Born, B., Müller, G.J., Schularick, M. and Sedláček, P., 2019. The costs of economic nationalism: 
evidence from the Brexit experiment. The Economic Journal, 129(623), pp.2722-2744. 
2 The cost of Brexit to June 2019 | Centre for European Reform (cer.eu) 
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Government with the EU could mean Scottish GDP is £9 billion lower (6.1%) by 
2030 compared with EU membership3.  
 
COVID has added to the challenge. The Scottish Government made it clear last 
year that it was deeply irresponsible to proceed with the end of the EU Exit 
transition period at the same time as the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic4 – advice 
that the UK Government ignored. But the data show that the impact on trade with 
the European Union has been particularly severe.  
 
Overall UK trade in goods has fallen considerably with total exports and imports 
falling from £266.4 billion in the first four months of 2018 to £237.6 billion in the 
equivalent period in 20215. Comparisons are made with 2018 as it is the most 
recent period in which relatively stable trade patterns were observed, and were not 
impacted by either the pandemic or the end of the EU transition period6. But the 
decreases in trade with the EU have been much larger than the declines in non EU 
trade. When compared to January-April 2018, exports of goods to the EU were 
19% lower in 2021, compared to non-EU exports of goods which were only 4% 
lower. The difference is Brexit. 
 
Going beyond these headline statistics, we know from business surveys that many 
Scottish businesses have faced additional trading costs due to EU exit since the 
start of 2021. Evidence from the ONS Business Insights and Conditions Survey 
(BICS)7 suggests that businesses experiencing challenges with exporting or 
importing attribute the main cause of these difficulties to the end of the EU 
transition period not the COVID-19 pandemic. Latest data from the BICS survey 
covering business feedback in May also indicate that a third of all manufacturing 
                                         
3 Bad Brexit deal for Scotland - gov.scot (www.gov.scot) 
4 Brexit transition - gov.scot (www.gov.scot)  Extend Brexit transition during COVID-19 crisis - 
gov.scot (www.gov.scot) 
5 All trade comparisons are sourced from HMRC Overseas Trade Statistics (OTS) which provides 
detailed UK trade in goods information.  This is the preferred source as it allows for comparison at 
commodity level, which is unavailable in ONS statistics. Trade in gold has been excluded from the 
figures and calculations. Some of the quoted figures differ from those also published by ONS.  
Although the ONS use the same HMRC data source, they make adjustments to account for 
seasonality and to ensure consistency with a Balance of Payments (BoP) basis.  However we use 
the HMRC OTS data as it provides the necessary detail to assess performance of some of the key 
commodities for Scotland’s exports. 
6 Monthly trade figures were relatively more volatile in 2019 than in 2018 due to the stockpiling 
activity associated with the EU exit deadlines in March and October 2019. Monthly figures in 2020 
were skewed by the impact of the pandemic. The Office for National Statistics (ONS) also compare 
2021 trade data with equivalent 2018 data for the same reasons. 
7 BICS weighted Scotland estimates: data to wave 31 - gov.scot (www.gov.scot) 
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businesses in Scotland have faced increased costs due to red tape, and almost half 
have faced increased transportation costs.  
This is also reflected in feedback from over 670 importing and exporting businesses 
Scottish Enterprise engaged with between January and April 2021 across a range 
of sectors, including food and drink (25%), oil and gas (21%) and technology and 
engineering (18%). Forty-one percent of these businesses reported that the top 
challenges they faced at the time were caused by the end of the transition period, 
such as transportation costs (named by 17% of the businesses) and disruption and 
issues at UK borders (13%). 
 
As predicted by Scottish Government analysis8, the most immediate, severe and 
visible impacts are disproportionately concentrated in specific areas of the Scottish 
economy – sectors which are also disproportionately represented in Scotland at a 
UK level, i.e. the food sector, particularly seafood, meat and dairy, as well as 
beverages and textiles. 
 
According to HMRC, UK exports of food and live animals to the EU, which includes 
seafood and fish, decreased by £1.2 billion (34%) in the first four months of 2021 
compared to the equivalent period in 2018, with stricter checks and certifications 
being one of the main reasons. Reports showed that in January 2021, for example, 
the consignment sign-off was taking six times longer and that the transit of goods to 
France was taking three days instead of an overnight transit9. For some of these 
sectors that makes the transaction simply unviable. 
 
The food and drink industry is a major contributor to Scotland’s economy. It was 
worth around £15 billion in 2018 (in turnover) and accounts for one in five 
manufacturing jobs. Scotland has 18,850 food and drink businesses, employing 
around 115,400 people10. 
 
The latest GDP data show that output in the food and drink sector decreased by 
0.5% in Q4 2020, whereas output across the economy as a whole increased by 
                                         
8 Coronavirus (COVID-19): the case for extending the Brexit transition period - gov.scot 
(www.gov.scot) 
9 UK trade - Office for National Statistics (ons.gov.uk) referring to reports from the Scottish 
Seafood Association: Scottish seafood exports 'held up by post-Brexit rules' - BBC News and 
Scottish seafood exports to EU delayed for further five days - BBC News 
10 Food and drink - gov.scot (www.gov.scot) 
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2.0%11 which captures both the impact of the pandemic and how the sector was 
already struggling with new barriers. 
 
The disruption to the seafood sector since early January offers the clearest 
evidence so far of the additional costs and losses associated with becoming an EU 
third country, and the trade frictions that result, including dealing with new and 
untested processes. Taking account of steps such as investment in upgrades to 
software and changes in working patterns, the shellfish sector has quoted 
increased costs of £500-600 per consignment, regardless of size12. 
 
Issues in the seafood sector are heavily interlinked: a consequence of the deal itself 
and lack of time to prepare for it, both here and in EU Member States. Over 70% of 
Scottish seafood exports were to the EU in 2019, worth over £770 million13. 
 
Following sharp falls in fish exports to EU countries in January 2021, February and 
March figures showed some signs of recovery. But April’s trade figures suggested 
any recovery was slowing down. Total UK exports of fish in 2021 were 27% lower 
than in the first four months of 2018. 
 
Some businesses could become completely unviable. For example, seed potatoes, 
one of Scotland’s key quality exports to the EU, are now prohibited from export to 
the EU.  The anticipated loss of these markets is estimated at £11 million based on 
the annual average of 20,000 tonnes exported to the EU and 2,000 tonnes 
exported to Northern Ireland. Most Scottish exporters were able to export to their 
EU and NI markets ahead of the end of the transition period for this growing season 
but the challenge is now for next and future seasons. Other goods – such as the 
movement of sheep – are facing new export barriers. These relate to compliance 
with manufacturing processes to ensure protection of human health and safety or 
protection of the environment also affecting manufacturing industries including 
chemicals. 
 
These stark figures mean real impacts on jobs and communities. Local authorities 
with high concentration of employment in Brexit-sensitive industries are particularly 
                                         
11 Economy statistics - gov.scot (www.gov.scot)  
12 Exclusive: 'It's a catastrophe': Scottish fishermen halt exports due to Brexit red tape | Reuters 
13 Over half (approx. £435 million) of all Scottish fish and seafood exports bound for the EU go to 
France. Much of the remaining exports go to Spain (£91 million), Italy (£56 million), the Irish 
Republic (£46 million) and Germany (£39 million). In 2019, seafood accounted for 57% of 
Scotland’s overall food exports and had a total value of £1.02 bn. 
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exposed to EU exit. For example, Moray and Aberdeenshire had the highest share 
of employment in food manufacturing in 2019, while Shetland Islands and Orkney 
Islands had the highest share of employment in fishing. And while this exposure to 
output losses is expected to be higher in rural areas, some urban areas with high 
reliance on manufacturing jobs are also likely to be impacted.  
 
Similar difficulties apply to imports. Project Management Institute (PMI) figures for 
May showed a further near record lengthening of lead times, pointing to a severe 
pressure in global supply chains. These pressures were mainly linked to shortages 
of inputs, raw materials and containers, transportation delays and COVID-19 
restrictions. Further anecdotal evidence suggests that many firms in the 
construction industry could face shortages of supplies due to EU Exit. A recent 
Construction PMI report also suggested a record high increase in input costs, 
reflecting a surge in demand for construction materials and severe supply 
shortages. 
 
Several uncertainties remain on medicines. Over two thirds of medicines normally 
used in the NHS are imported from the EU through a supply chain that is privately 
operated on a UK-wide basis. The impact of anticipated changes to customs 
controls due to take place in October 2021 and January 2022 are still unknown and 
in the latest communication with the pharmaceutical industry the DHSC Chief 
Commercial Officer advised the industry to retain the current level of preparedness 
to mitigate against any potential disruption to medicine supply14.  
 
As a result of leaving the EU, Great Britain will no longer have access to the single 
licensing process for medicines offered by the European Medicines Agency (EMA). 
This means that approvals for any new medicine on to the market in Great Britain 
have to undergo a separate approval process. Once fully in force in 24 months, the 
impact of the new GB regulatory processes on the attractiveness of the GB market 
to pharmaceutical companies, and on possible delays to the availability in Scotland 
of innovative new medicines, remains unknown.  
 
Some of these difficulties are about unavoidable new rules and regulations. Some 
are about costs which now need to be permanently factored in. They are the 
consequence of Brexit and it is clear that these problems are here to stay. 
 
                                         





Trade and economic disruption are the channels through which the immediate 
impacts of EU Exit have materialised. However as the majority of academic studies 
have shown15, the impact on productivity and net migration are the main 
contributors to the difference in economic performance compared to EU 
membership. This is primarily due to the importance of both channels to the overall 
productive capacity on the economy. Over time they will have a much greater and 
more permanent impact on the size of the economy and are where the greatest 
gains from a closer relationship with the EU would be found. 
 
National Records of Scotland’s latest population projections show that Scotland’s 
population will only grow due to inward migration as the number of deaths with 
outweigh the number of births16. These figures do not take into account the ending 
of free movement or the impact of the COVID pandemic on migration. 
 
Scotland faces a very different population challenge to the rest of the UK17. While 
inward migration is the main driver of population growth across the whole of the UK, 
in England and Northern Ireland the natural change is positive (as the number of 
births outweigh the numbers of deaths). In Wales and Scotland the natural change 
is negative, although to a greater degree in Scotland. 
 
It was estimated that in June 2020, 231,000 EU nationals18 lived in Scotland. 
However, the growth in the number of EU nationals working in Scotland has slowed 
since the EU referendum. National Insurance Number registrations of EU nationals 
in Scotland for the first quarter of 2021 were 70% below their pre-pandemic levels; 
however, the allocation process was disrupted as a result of the coronavirus 
pandemic19. The reduction of EU migration to Scotland is in line with analysis by the 
independent Expert Advisory Group on Migration and Population20, estimating a 50-
80% reduction in net EU migration to Scotland after 2020. 
                                         
15 As well as Scotland's place in Europe: people, jobs and investment - gov.scot (www.gov.scot) 
16 Publication (nrscotland.gov.uk) 
17 Overview of the UK population - Office for National Statistics (ons.gov.uk) 
18 Population by Country of Birth and Nationality, Scotland, July 2019 to June 2020 | National 
Records of Scotland (nrscotland.gov.uk) 
19 National Insurance numbers allocated to adult overseas nationals to March 2021 - GOV.UK 
(www.gov.uk) 
20 UK immigration policy after leaving the EU: impacts on Scotland's economy, population and 




Lower migration will be particularly harmful to sectors that rely on migrant workers, 
including textiles, agriculture, social care, leisure and travel and sales. ONS 
Business data for the period 11 January to 24 January, showed the proportion of 
accommodation and food businesses in Scotland that reported a decrease of EU 
workers over the previous nine months was 12.1% – more than double the rate for 
the economy as a whole (5.5%)21.  
 
This evidence is consistent with the recent study by Indeed job platform.  It found 
that EU nationals are less likely to seek work in the UK22. Searches from EU 
jobseekers on Indeed were down 36% since 2019, suggesting that businesses 
planning to recruit from overseas are likely to face challenges. According to the 
study, that decline in EU jobseeker interest is likely to be a consequence of the 
ending of freedom of movement for EU citizens in 2021 rather than the pandemic.  
 
At the same time the demand for workers is increasing. Data from the jobs website 
Adzuna collected by the Office for National Statistics23 shows that vacancies in the 
last week of May were 20% higher in Scotland than a weekly average in February 
2020, mainly driven by the manufacturing, distribution and catering and hospitality 
sectors. Higher number of vacancies in these sectors can be a reflection of the 
relaxation of restrictions, but also of businesses struggling to fill vacancies due to a 
decline in the numbers of EU workers. This trend is likely to worsen as restrictions 
ease. The opening up of the tourism sector for example raises real concerns as to 
how vacancies can be filled. Industry representatives have said there is currently a 
shortfall of about 188,000 workers, with a particular shortage of front-of-house staff 
and chefs24. 
 
Other sectors such as agriculture are already experiencing labour shortages and 
challenges are likely to increase. According to Scottish Government research25 
there were around 9,300 seasonal workers in Scottish agriculture in 2017, a sector 
heavily reliant on non-UK workers, particularly from central and eastern Europe. As 
such, another survey26 indicated that labour shortages were already evident in 
2017, with 48% of respondents stating that they had ‘difficulty harvesting’ due to 
labour shortages. The Scottish Agricultural Census, undertaken by RESAS every 
                                         
21 BICS weighted Scotland estimates: data to wave 31 - gov.scot (www.gov.scot) 
22 International Jobseeker Interest in Britain is Changing After Brexit - Indeed Hiring Lab UK I 
Ireland 
23 Vacancies and jobs in the UK - Office for National Statistics (ons.gov.uk) 
24 Hospitality 'struggling to fill thousands of jobs' - BBC News  
25 The Fruits of Their Labour: Seasonal Farm Workers in Scottish Agriculture | SEFARI 
26 NFU Scotland’s Seasonal Workers Survey Identifies Labour Shortage Fears 
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year in June, also showed that there was a 4% decrease in seasonal labourers 
between 2019 and 202027. It is therefore likely that the EU Exit will continue to have 
adverse effects on the seasonal workforce in agriculture. 
 
Scotland’s cultural and creative sectors are good examples of sectors impacted by 
the loss of freedom of movement in both directions. The full effect will only become 
apparent with the end of COVID restrictions. For sectors that have at their very 
heart collaboration, exchange and internationalism it is certain that increased 
barriers to working with their closest international peers will present a massive 
challenge and seriously hinder their recovery from COVID. 
 
The increased cost and administrative burdens of touring will put working in the EU 
beyond the reach of many of Scotland’s artists, for whom the ability to tour 
internationally is vital in terms of reaching new audiences, generating income, 
collaborating and building vital networks across borders, and showcasing Scotland 
internationally. Additionally, the UK Government’s refusal to negotiate continued 
participation in the Creative Europe programme remains deeply concerning. As one 
of the key mechanisms that supported Scotland’s cultural and creative sectors to 
develop new international relationships and fostered cultural collaboration, the 
programme made new connections for Scotland across Europe and beyond. Its 
loss will be felt keenly. 
 
EU Citizens in Scotland 
 
Behind each headline statistic lie many individual life stories. This is particularly true 
of the many EU citizens who have chosen to make Scotland their home.  
With the end of the EU Settled Status (EUSS) scheme by July 2021, potentially 
hundreds of thousands of EU citizens could find themselves in a ‘legal limbo’ 
according to a recent report by the UK in a Changing Europe think tank28. Home 
Office figures show that 5,605,800 applications were received to the EUSS up to 31 
May 2021, 276,600 of which were from Scotland29. Of the Scottish applications, 
around 8,100 were received in May alone. Whilst many have managed to 
successfully secure settled or pre-settled status, the UK in a Changing Europe 
report shows there might be hundreds of thousands of people who are eligible but 
have yet to apply and will immediately lose their rights of residence. The 
percentage refused applications has increased from 1 to 2%, while the percentages 
                                         
27 Scottish Agricultural Census: final results - June 2020 - gov.scot (www.gov.scot) 
28 The EU Settlement Scheme | UK in a changing Europe (ukandeu.ac.uk) 
29 Home Office EU Settlement Scheme statistics: user guide - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk) 
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for withdrawn and invalid applications have stayed broadly the same. If we consider 
only the most recently concluded applications, however, of the 153,100 EUSS 
applications concluded in May, approximately 15% were refused, 4% were 




Scottish Higher Education has been heavily impacted by a number of factors, in 
particular COVID-19 and new UK immigration restrictions on EU nationals post 
Brexit. Scottish universities have seen substantial declines in numbers of 
international students and research grants. Applications to Scottish universities 
from students domiciled in the EU fell by 40% in 2021.  
 
With the UK Government deciding not to associate to Erasmus+, the number of 
international exchange students is likely to decrease as well. According to HESA 
figures, in 2018/19 alone, 2,935 Erasmus+ students attended Scottish Universities, 
compared to 2,755 in 2019/2030. Losing these students will not only impact 
financially on Scottish institutions, it will also impoverish the lives of many 
individuals and Scotland as a whole – our institutions thrive thanks to their diverse, 
international student bodies. 
 
The UK Government’s decision to discontinue Erasmus participation will of course 
also be acutely felt by young Scots. For them, Brexit means a sudden and 
unwelcome end to a life-enhancing opportunity.  
 
The UK Government’s replacement Turing Scheme is a poor alternative by any 
measure. It offers no support for youth clubs, adult learners, staff, or the inward 
mobility of participants to the UK. Instead the Turing Scheme has a significantly 
lower budget than the UK received every year from Erasmus, is much more limited 
in scope and consequently will reduce the number of opportunities available to 
young people from Scotland in the EU.  
 
This is an example of where Brexit will impact most on those who are already 
disadvantaged. Socioeconomically disadvantaged people, and people outwith 
traditional education pathways, who would have benefited from international 
learning opportunities such as those funded through Erasmus and other European 
                                         
30 HE Student Data | HESA 
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funds, now face reduced support from the UK Government. There are clear 




The impact on research in Scotland has already begun to be felt, although it will 
take time to see the longer term impacts and trends.  
 
After Horizon 2020 launched in 2014, almost 755 million euros of funding in 
research and innovation was secured by Scottish organisations. That was around 
11% share of the UK’s Horizon 2020 funding. Scotland’s universities won over 75% 
or €572 million of our total funds won31. 
 
Scotland’s typical annual share of Horizon 2020 funding declined in the remaining 
years of Horizon 2020 following the Brexit Referendum in 2016, mainly due to the 
uncertainty about future UK participation in Horizon Europe. Given the high overall 
amount of funds won annually by Scotland as one of the top European research 
nations, funding and key opportunities for Scotland with the EU science base were 
lost or weakened. 
 
Public comments from the sector suggest that EU partners may have been nervous 
about including Scottish partners in research consortia despite their ability to 
continue under Horizon 2020 grants at the time. The end of freedom of movement 
for researchers is a further difficulty. The sector in Scotland has pressed the UK 
Government to ease mobility for EU-based researchers through the UK visa system 
– so far without success. Scottish Government initiatives to explain to EU citizens 
that they are genuinely welcome in Scotland, as well as support provided to this 
group by the Scottish Government are therefore important. And of course, the 
immediate post Brexit Referendum years have seen fewer opportunities for 
Scottish-based early career researchers. 
 
There have also been measurable impacts on staffing and the important pipeline of 
research students from Europe who contribute to the next generation of research 
leaders in Scotland. For example, 3% of all staff at Scottish Higher Education 
Institutes solely involved in research were funded by EU government bodies in 
                                         
31 eCORDA, accessed in 2020 
12 
2018-19, down 6% from the previous year. EU research PhDs in Scotland dropped 
almost 7% between 2015-16 and 2019-20. 
Longer term, participation in Horizon Europe may stabilise and recover as long as 
the UK maintains participation at association level – although decreased mobility 
with Europe in terms of research staff and research student numbers will persist if 
policies restricting freedom of movement continue. The impact of Brexit on research 
in Scotland is already being felt.  
Governance 
Many of the issues outlined here affect all parts of the UK. But some issues impact 
disproportionately on Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland. In particular, the way 
in which the UK has chosen to respond to EU Exit is doing real and lasting damage 
to agreed and well-established governance arrangements in the UK. This led the 
Welsh Government to challenge the new arrangements in the courts, an action 
which the Scottish Government supported. 
This was evident already during the EU Exit negotiations, with the UK Government 
repeatedly ignoring the established convention of seeking the Scottish Parliament’s 
consent (the Sewel Convention) and the UK Government’s failure to involve the 
Scottish Government and the other Devolved Administrations meaningfully in 
preparations for the negotiations themselves. This has since been compounded by 
the UK Government’s Internal Market Act. This allows it to: 
• Undermine standards voted on by the democratically elected Scottish 
Parliament;
• Use direct funding in devolved areas to bypass the Scottish Government in 
ways that undermine its priorities, leading to inefficient spending and policy 
incoherence;
• Further reduce the already limited scope for the Scottish Government to 
protect the interests of Scottish businesses, farmers and consumers in 
international trade negotiations. The UK Government has just demonstrated 







There is very real concern that despite the assurances given at the time, EU Exit 
will over time lead to diminution in standards of various sorts, ranging from social 
protection, to animal welfare and the environment. 
 
The recently announced trade deal with Australia will inevitably mean that Scottish 
farmers will be competing on an un-level playing field with Australian imports 
produced at lower welfare standards. There are particular concerns around hot 
branding, sow stalls and the conditions in which animals are permitted to be 
exported live. 
 
Whilst the Scottish Government has undertaken extensive work to prepare for the 
challenges posed by EU Exit for the environment – for example, gaining consent to 
55 statutory instruments (SIs) and 15 Scottish statutory instruments (SSIs) and 
establishing a new, independent environmental governance body, Environmental 
Standards Scotland, to uphold and enforce environmental law – similar concerns 
apply in that area. For example, it is far from certain whether, in light of the UK’s 
Internal Market Act, the Scottish Parliament will have a free hand, as it should, to 
follow beneficial EU legislation and take necessary, urgent action in response to the 
climate and biodiversity crises. Over time, if our ability to uphold high environmental 
standards is compromised, this will impact on the services that society and the 
economy receive from our natural capital. And if our reputation for environmental 




The impacts of Brexit go beyond our trading relationship. It was clear in 2016 that 
leaving the EU would have serious consequences for our policing, safety and 
security. 
 
The UK has lost access to the Schengen Information System (SIS). The UK 
Government failed to negotiate a replacement for SIS, meaning our police forces do 




Scotland has also lost access to the European Arrest Warrant, which allowed those 
accused of the most serious crimes to be brought back to Scotland to face justice in 
a matter of hours. The UK Government’s replacement has serious limitations: 10 
EU member states have declared that they will never surrender their nationals to 
the UK due to their constitutional rules, and most others have imposed some form 
of additional conditionality on the extradition to the UK of their own nationals.  
 
Both these very negative impacts make it hard to combat criminals who are 
increasingly sophisticated, mobile and international.  
 
Because of Brexit Scottish prosecutors have also lost access to the European 
Judicial Network, which they used much more extensively than their counterparts in 
the rest of the UK. Losing access to this ready-made network of contact points has 
made the transition to non-EU based tools and measures more difficult, with 
cooperation between prosecutors slower and more cumbersome. This delays the 
process of bringing people to justice and means that victims of crime are having to 
wait longer for justice. 
 
Standing in the world  
 
Many influential commentators have observed that Brexit – both the fact of EU Exit 
and the way in which it was conducted – has had a deleterious effect on the 
reputation of the UK around the world. The common theme appears to be unease 
as to how Brexit can be reconciled with any perception of the UK as an outward-
facing, collaborative country, which can aspire to be an influential player in a rules-
based world order. For example:  
• Sir Simon Fraser, Deputy Chairman of Chatham House (and previously Perm 
Sec FCO) wrote in September 2020 that “The claim that leaving the EU would 
open a highway to British global influence was always hollow. Since 2016, the 
UK’s influence has declined; our forces are barely present in international 
theatres of conflict and… the Brexit soap opera undermines our diplomacy 
and soft power.”32  
 
• Earlier this month, Michel Barnier said “The United Kingdom needs to pay 
attention to its reputation, I want Mr Johnson to respect his signature.”33  
                                         
32 Picking Up the Broken Pieces of UK Foreign Policy | Chatham House – International Affairs 
Think Tank 
33 Michel Barnier tells Boris Johnson to ‘respect his signature’ on Brexit deal and warns UK 







This analysis describes an emerging picture of the impact of Brexit on Scotland. 
The Scottish Government will add to this analysis over time as the real impacts 
become clearer and through regular conversation with stakeholders, whose active 
input we will seek.  
 
However, we can already say with confidence that across a wide range of areas, 
Brexit is having a tangible and harmful impact on the quality of life of the people of 
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